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Abstract
Different forms of sociality have evolved via unique evolutionary trajectories. However, it
remains unknown to what extent trajectories of social evolution depend on the specific char-
acteristics of different species. Our approach to studying such trajectories is to use evolu-
tionary case-studies, so that we can investigate how grouping co-evolves with a multitude
of individual characteristics. Here we focus on anti-predator vigilance and foraging. We use
an individual-based model, where behavioral mechanisms are specified, and costs and
benefits are not predefined. We show that evolutionary changes in grouping alter selection
pressures on vigilance, and vice versa. This eco-evolutionary feedback generates an evolu-
tionary progression from “leader-follower” societies to “fission-fusion” societies, where
cooperative vigilance in groups is maintained via a balance between within- and between-
group selection. Group-level selection is generated from an assortment that arises sponta-
neously when vigilant and non-vigilant foragers have different grouping tendencies. The
evolutionary maintenance of small groups, and cooperative vigilance in those groups, is
therefore achieved simultaneously. The evolutionary phases, and the transitions between
them, depend strongly on behavioral mechanisms. Thus, integrating behavioral mecha-
nisms and eco-evolutionary feedback is critical for understanding what kinds of intermediate
stages are involved during the evolution of particular forms of sociality.
Introduction
Understanding how different forms of sociality evolve is a major challenge. While in many
cases, sociality has probably evolved due to common evolutionary pressures, such as predation
[1–3], the evolutionary consequences of grouping differ across taxonomic groups. For instance,
compared to antelope, primates typically have stronger social bonds and greater relative brain
size [4, 5]. Differences between these two taxonomic groups probably depend on how grouping
has co-evolved with other aspects of biology such as morphology, diet, defense of resources,
life-history parameters, and cultural inheritance [6–10]. It is a challenge to find out to what
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0117027 January 28, 2015 1 / 19
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: van der Post DJ, Verbrugge R, Hemelrijk
CK (2015) The Evolution of Different Forms of
Sociality: Behavioral Mechanisms and Eco-
Evolutionary Feedback. PLoS ONE 10(1): e0117027.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117027
Academic Editor: Long Wang, Peking University,
CHINA
Received: July 22, 2014
Accepted: December 17, 2014
Published: January 28, 2015
Copyright: © 2015 van der Post et al. This is an
open access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are
credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the paper and its Supporting Information files.
Funding: This research was funded by the
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
(http://www.nwo.nl/en): Vici grant NWO-277-80-001
awarded to Rineke Verbrugge (in the project
Cognitive systems in interaction: Logical and
computational models of higher-order social
cognition). The funders had no role in study design,
data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
extent specific characteristics of species affect trajectories of social evolution. We therefore use
multi-scale models to investigate how grouping co-evolves with other aspects of a species’
biology.
Two factors are likely to be important for the co-evolution of grouping with other biological
traits. First, such co-evolution involves multiple social phenomena, which are inter-related.
Using models, it has been shown that grouping can interact (i) with diet learning, to generate
cultural phenomena [11, 12]; (ii) with dominance interactions and grooming, to generate vari-
ous social patterns [13–16]; and (iii) with anti-predator vigilance, to generate detection of pred-
ators at a group level [17, 18]. The grouping process is therefore causally related to multiple
social phenomena, and as a result, evolutionary changes in one phenomenon can cause changes
in another.
Second, the co-evolution of multiple social phenomena may generate eco-evolutionary feed-
back. Here, eco-evolutionary feedback refers to the process where the evolution of a trait, such
as grouping, changes social and/or ecological conditions, resulting in changes in the selective
pressures on other traits, such as vigilance, and vice versa. Such reciprocal feedback is referred
to as (social) niche construction [19, 20], and can operate on at least two timescales.
On relatively short timescales, eco-evolutionary feedback can be expected to alter the socio-
ecological dynamics of particular forms of sociality, as compared to dynamics without evolu-
tion. For instance, in the context of predator-prey co-evolution, model studies have revealed
that eco-evolutionary feedback can affect the number of predator and prey species that can co-
exist, as well as shortening the period of population dynamics [21]. On relatively long time-
scales, eco-evolutionary feedback is a prerequisite for the origin and evolution of new forms of
sociality: Evolution changes the selection pressures and therewith the prevailing social pheno-
types and their socio-ecological relationships that characterize a social system. The analogy
with evolutionary game theory, where socio-ecological conditions are simplified into games
with a set of strategies and payoffs, is that eco-evolutionary feedback alters the dynamics within
games on short timescales, and changes one game into another on longer timescales (e.g. one
with or without a cooperative dilemma). The long-term process concerns shifts in functionality
of traits, such as most likely occurred in primates, who groom much more frequently than
would be expected for its original purpose of hygiene [22]: It is possible that during the evolu-
tion of grouping in primates, evolutionary pressures on grooming were altered, and grooming
became co-opted for social bonding, enabling new kinds of sociality to evolve.
Current theory on co-evolution of social phenomena: At present, theory on evolutionary
trajectories with changing forms of sociality and shifts in functionality of traits, is highly under-
developed. It is mostly unknown how evolutionary trajectories depend on (i) mechanistic de-
tails, (ii) the co-evolution of multiple social traits, and (iii) eco-evolutionary feedback. In many
models, mechanistic details are not specified [23] and the focus is on particular social traits in
isolation, such as optimal group size [24–27], optimal vigilance levels in groups [17, 28–30], or
strong abstractions such as cooperative strategies with fixed payoffs [31–33]. In such models,
evolution is constrained to fixed socio-ecological settings (‘games’).
However, a growing body of evidence suggests that the inclusion of mechanistic detail
[34, 35], co-evolution of social traits [36, 37], and eco-evolutionary feedback [20, 21, 38, 39],
leads to qualitatively different model outcomes. In particular, recent models in which grouping
and cooperation co-evolve [36, 37], reveal the importance of multi-level selection and evolu-
tionary change in the interaction structure of a population: Group sizes evolve to the point
where between-group selection can maintain cooperation within populations. Since there are
many social traits that could co-evolve, such results may be just the tip of an iceberg.
Evolutionary case-studies:One way of studying the co-evolution of multiple traits and the
evolution of socio-ecological settings is to use evolutionary case-studies. Here we conduct such
Evolution of Different Forms of Sociality
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a case-study in a model where grouping co-evolves with foraging, movement, and anti-
predator vigilance behavior. In our model, simplistic foragers search for food, and can detect
predators and escape from them. Predators search for and attempt to catch foragers (S1
Video). This occurs in a 2-dimensional spatial environment, where 2 predators and roughly
100 foragers move in a continuous space. A set of evolvable parameters determines grouping
tendencies, and the propensity of foragers to scan for predators. If grouping tendencies evolve,
contagious fleeing transmits information about predators within groups (S2 Video). Vigilance
and grouping both lead to reduced predation risk and longer lifespan, but reduce the rate of
food intake and reproduction: Grouping generates within-group competition and vigilance
takes time and trades off with foraging. Since foragers can benefit from the vigilance of others,
this sets the stage for a cooperative dilemma and within-group selection against vigilance.
We start our simulations with solitary individuals and study what kinds of sociality evolve.
We do this to address the following theoretical issues: (i) How does cooperative foraging origi-
nate via the co-evolution of vigilance and grouping tendencies? (ii) Does eco-evolutionary feed-
back arise after the origin of grouping, and what are its consequences? (iii) How does an
evolutionary trajectory depend on mechanistic detail and the co-evolution of multiple traits?
Our results show that group foraging evolves because transmitting information about pred-
ators in groups generates synergy. Moreover, we find that mechanistic detail determines the
nature of the co-evolution of multiple traits, and results in an eco-evolutionary succession of
distinct forms of sociality, namely leader-follower societies characterized by a ‘traveling mutu-
alism’, which is followed by dynamic fission-fusion societies, characterized by a ‘cooperative di-
lemma’. In the latter societies, a co-evolution between grouping tendencies and vigilance leads
to the evolution of group sizes where cooperative vigilance can be maintained.
Materials and Methods
The aim of our approach is to capture the multi-scale nature of behavioral processes and
patterns, as well as their ecological and evolutionary consequences [40–43], so that socio-
ecological settings (i.e. strategies, and their costs and benefits) are not predefined. Our model is
therefore designed so that sociality is an emergent property that self-organizes from the inter-
action of individuals with their local environment.
In our individual-based model, we specify (i) the size of the environment and the initial dis-
tribution, energy content and renewal of resources, (ii) the number of predators and how easily
they catch foragers, (iii) the local sensing and decision-making of foragers and predators (local
information processing), and (iv) parameters that define how much energy foragers obtain
from resource items, and the energy they require to reproduce (life-history constraints). The
specifications in our model define the relationship between the environment (32 km2), maxi-
mum life-span (20 years), minimum inter-birth interval (several months), detection ranges
(<50 meters), duration of behavioral actions (>10s), and maximal movement speed (0.1 m/s).
This spatio-temporal scaling context is inspired by, and is probably most relevant to, small
mammals such as monkeys, but also takes computational constraints into account.
From these specifications (Fig. 1A, solid boxes), various dynamics emerge on multiple time-
scales (Fig. 1A, dashed boxes). The most immediate dynamic is behavioral pattern formation:
the interaction between decision-making and local environmental context generates behavioral
patterns, such as foraging, vigilance and grouping. Food intake rates then determine at what
rate foragers reproduce or whether they starve, and vigilance and grouping patterns determine
survival via predation avoidance. In turn, these life-history variables determine population
growth and competition. Competition arises from depletion of resources in the environment,
and the population grows to the point where births and deaths are balanced on average (90–
Evolution of Different Forms of Sociality
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120 foragers, depending on vigilance levels). The population density (3.75 individuals per km2)
is then within the range observed for monkeys [44]. During reproduction, mutations can
change the value of the pseudo-genes (parameters) that define sensing and decision making of
foragers (Table 1). If genetic differences give rise to differences in reproduction and survival,
this leads to natural selection for pseudo-genes that generate the most successful behavioral
patterns.
Darwinian fitness therefore depends on how behavior patterns affect survival and reproduc-
tion of individuals, and overlapping generations ensure that Darwinian fitness is relative to an
existing population structure. Since all social phenomena (e.g. coordinated travel and vigilance
in groups) emerge through grouping, they are causally related. This enables eco-evolutionary
feedback, where newly evolved social phenomena, such as grouping, can alter selection pres-
sures on other behavior, such as vigilance, so that socio-ecological settings (‘games’)
can evolve.
The high spatio-temporal resolution requires simplification of social, mechanistic and envi-
ronmental detail. Simplifications include low cognitive sophistication of individuals, low envi-
ronmental diversity, and a limit on the number of social traits. Such simplifications can be
addressed by using relatively basic case-studies as baselines, so that on their basis, the dynamics
in more complex case-studies can be understood. The present study therefore increases the
complexity of our evolutionary system relative to previous studies on the evolution of solitary
and group foraging without predation [43, 45]. Below we describe individual behavior, life-
history, and the environment in more detail.
Local information processing: The behavioral repertoire of foragers is implemented as
a set of actions that take time: (i) foraging: MOVE, FOODSCAN, MOVETOFOOD, EAT;
(ii) anti-predation: SCAN and FLEE (Fig. 1B). We use an event-based formalism where action
durations can evolve to minimally 10 seconds. Foraging is initialized using previously evolved
Figure 1. Summary of model dynamics and anti-predator behavior. A) Model dynamics. Solid boxes indicate model aspects that are implemented,
namely the initial environment and pseudo-genes defining sensing and decision making of foragers. Dashed boxes indicate emergent processes on longer
timescales: As foragers interact with local contexts in the environment, they generate behavioral patterns which in turn determine reproduction and survival
and cause resource depletion. Reproduction and survival affect population growth and competition. If variation in pseudo-genes (due to mutations) results in
differential reproduction and survival, natural selection emerges. B) Anti-predator behavior. Foragers start in a normal foraging state (top dashed box) and
can decide to scan for a predator with probability pV. Only if a predator is detected, or a neighbor flees, does the forager flee, at which point it reaches a safe
state (bottom dashed box). Here it continues to scan until it no longer detects the predator. After that, the forager continues scanning for another tPminutes,
before it returns to a normal foraging state.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117027.g001
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parameters, which have been described and extensively studied elsewhere [43]. Although forag-
ing parameters can evolve in the present study, they do not qualitatively change (see Support-
ing Information S2 Text). Since foraging and vigilance actions take time, there is a trade-off
between vigilance and foraging.
Vigilance: Evolvable vigilance parameter pV determines the rate at which foragers SCAN for
predators after each foraging action (Fig. 1B). The probability to detect the predator pD de-
pends on distance (as in [18]): pD ¼ aðhN=½dNFP þ hN Þ where N determines how steeply preda-
tor detection decreases with distance to the predator dFP (maximally 50 meters), h is the
distance at which predator detection probability is half maximal, and α = 0.5. If they detect a
predator, foragers FLEE and escape. A forager also flees if a neighbor flees, or if a predator at-
tacks. After FLEE, foragers reach safety, and are subsequently ignored by the predator (Fig. 1B,
bottom dashed box). During FLEE, foragers do not change position, like monkeys that rush up
a tree at a given location (S2 Video). After FLEE, foragers continue to detect the predator as
long as the predator is within 50 meters. Thereafter, foragers continue to SCAN for tP minutes,
which ensures that foragers do not resume foraging until the predator is out of detection range.
Grouping: For grouping, foragers adjust their MOVE direction according to the position of
neighbors (S2 Video). We use grouping rules from a previous study [45], based on repulsion-
alignment-attraction models [46–49], which represents a simple mechanism that has been
shown (in models) to generate various grouping patterns through self-organization. The rules
are: (i) If nRZ> nR, foragers turn away from neighbors in a repulsion zone zR, where nR defines
how many neighbors a forager tolerates in its repulsion zone, and nRZ is the actual number
of neighbors in its repulsion zone; (ii) If nRZ nR, foragers turn towards neighbors in an
Table 1. Evolvable parameters of foragers.
Category Parameter Min Max St. dev. Units
Decision making (probability to choose action) pV (predator scan) 0.0 1.0 0.2
pM (move after move) 0.0 1.0 0.2
pSE (food scan after eat) 0.0 1.0 0.2
pSN (food scan after nofood) 0.0 1.0 0.2
pMTF (move to food) 0.0 1.0 0.2
Vigilance tV (scan duration) 0.167 1.99 0.4 min
aV (scan angle) 0.0 360 72 degrees
Fleeing tP (ﬂee duration) 0.0 - 5 min
Grouping aR (repulsion turning angle) 0.0 360 72 degrees
aA (attraction turning angle) 0.0 360 72 degrees
zR (repulsion zone) 0 50 10 m
zA (attraction zone) zR 50 10 m
nR (tolerated neighbors) 0 - 1 m
Movement tM (move duration) 0.167 1.99 0.4 min
dM (move distance) 0.0 - 3 m
aM (move angle) 0.0 360 72 degrees
Foraging tF (foodscan duration) 0.167 1.99 0.4 min
dF (foodscan distance) 0.0 - 3 m
aF (foodscan angle) 0.0 360 72 degrees
The standard deviation of mutation is scaled to be approximately 0.2 times the range of the parameter. The maximum of durations was imposed due to
how the model was programmed, but was high enough not to affect the results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117027.t001
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attraction zone zA (where zR zA 50 m), and towards the average direction of foragers in an
alignment zone zL (where zR zL 25 m). The angle that foragers turn is determined by rotat-
ing a forager’s heading towards a preferred heading, which depends on whether the forager is
repulsed or attracted. To allow for variation in responsiveness to neighbors, we include maxi-
mal turning angles: a repulsion turning angle (aR) and an attraction turning angle (aA). If the
angle between a forager’s heading and the preferred heading is more than the maximal turning
angle, then the forager only turns up to the maximal turning angle.
Life-history: Foragers reproduce when their energy reaches a threshold (105). Energy in-
creases when the energy intake from food (2 energy units per item) exceeds metabolism (1 en-
ergy unit per minute). The offspring inherits half the parent’s energy, and evolvable parameters
(Table 1). Evolvable parameters mutate with probability 0.05, in which case the offspring’s pa-
rameter value is drawn from a normal distribution centered on the parent’s parameter value,
with a standard deviation scaled relative to values expected for that parameter (Table 1). The
mutation rate was chosen operationally, such that grouping was observed to evolve. Foragers
live maximally 20 years, covering multiple reproductive events, but generally die earlier due to
starvation, a stochastic death rate, and predation.
Environment:
Resources: Food is uniformly distributed in the environment, at a density that supports the
forager population (0.535 resource units per m2). Food items disappear when eaten, and re-
grow over time such that on average there is a regular renewal of resources. Since resources are
depleted locally through foraging, foragers need to move to find food. In addition, foraging
competition is generated within groups.
Predators: the two predators are solitary, and do not die or reproduce. A predator moves
forward continually, until a forager is within 50 meters. The closest forager is then approached
up to a critical distance dP, at which point the predator attacks and catches the forager. The
predator can immediately hunt again.
For further model details please see Supporting Information S1 Text.
Analysis
We ran evolutionary simulations with three levels of predation risk. Predation risk was varied
by changing a critical distance (dP = 5, 7, 9) that the predator had to approach in order to catch
a forager. Evolutionary simulations where initialized with vigilance and foraging parameters
that had evolved in solitary populations (see Supporting Information S2 Text).
To obtain an overview of evolved parameters, we conducted ancestor traces on evolutionary
simulations, starting with the final population and backtracing to the beginning. Average pa-
rameters from ancestors at the end of the simulation (between year 800–900) over all simula-
tions were taken as evolved parameters. For group size (number of neighbors within 50
meters), we calculated averages over the last 50 simulation years.
More detailed lineage analysis was conducted by repeating ancestor traces from different
time points (e.g. at 20 year intervals) and merging them. This reveals lineages that go extinct
before the end of the simulations, which can represent interesting events or dynamics, such as
periods with co-existing genotypes. Such genotypes and the effect of their interactions on fit-
ness were studied using different kinds of simulation: (i) invasion simulations where one or
more genotypes could invade a population of one or more other genotypes, i.e. one genotype
changes into another via a single mutation, but no other mutational changes occur; (ii) con-
trolled evolutionary simulations where (a) vigilance was fixed, or (b) vigilance could only mu-
tate between two values, but grouping parameters could evolve freely.
Evolution of Different Forms of Sociality
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In the following, we focus on the vigilance and grouping parameters that are necessary to
explain our results. For a complete overview please see Supporting Information Texts S2
and S3.
Results
We find that grouping evolves in response to predation, and larger groups evolve when we in-
crease the distance dP at which predators catch foragers (Fig. 2A, blue): grouping dilutes the
risk of being caught per predator attack, and contagious fleeing spreads information about
predators (see Supporting Information S4 Text). Vigilance (pV) evolves to smaller values in
groups (orange) than in populations of solitary foragers (grey), and vigilance completely disap-
pears under high predation risk when groups are large (dP = 7 and dP = 9, Fig. 2A).
To study its co-evolution with grouping, we focus on the case where vigilance is present
(dP = 5). Typical simulations exhibit three evolutionary phases: (I) a solitary phase; (II) a small
group phase (mainly pairs); and (III) a large group phase with fluctuations in group size
(Fig. 2B, blue). Of 10 simulations, 9 reached phase II, and 7 of those reached phase III. In phase
III a co-evolutionary dynamics between group size and vigilance can be observed, where vigi-
lance (Fig. 2B, orange) decreases when larger groups (Fig. 2B, blue) evolve, and vice versa. To
understand this evolutionary trajectory (Fig. 2B), we determined what types of individual were
present in phase II and III, and studied their behavior.
Phase II: Leaders and followers. After the origin of grouping (at the start of phase II), for-
agers have weak grouping tendencies and form pairs. Lineage analysis over the period from
year 40 to 320 reveals multiple co-existing lineages during phase II (Fig. 3A, red (arrows a to d)
and orange lineages), even at the origin of grouping (Fig. 3A, circle at lineage a). Foragers in
Figure 2. Overview and case-study. A: An overview of evolutionary simulations reveals that larger groups evolve when predation risk dP is greater (blue
dashed). Compared to simulations without evolution of grouping (grey dotted), vigilance evolves to smaller values (orange solid) if grouping evolves. Shown
are means and standard deviation. B: The time course of mean group size (blue) and mean vigilance (orange) in a case-study for dP = 5 exhibits three
phases: (I) a solitary phase; (II) a small group phase; and (III) a large group phase where group size and vigilance co-evolve: when group size increases
vigilance declines, and vice versa.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117027.g002
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orange lineages are more strongly repulsed by neighbors than those in red lineages (see below).
This difference in tolerance leads to the formation of “leader-follower” pairs (Fig. 3B and
S3 Video).
The difference in tolerance evolves via a differentiation in the repulsion turning angle aR,
and/or the repulsion zone zR. Initially (year 80) leaders and followers are differentiated in their
repulsion zone zR: 21.06 in leaders and 13.74 in followers, with a repulsion turning angle aR of
0.373 (Fig. 3A, F80 and L80). Later (year 140–230) these differences are reduced (zR is 21.06 in
followers and 22.5 in leaders), and instead the two genotypes differ in the repulsion turning
angle (aR is 0.0 in followers and 0.825 in leaders; Fig. 3A, F180 and L180). Both types of differen-
tiation generate leader-follower movement.
The difference in tolerance leads to leader-follower movement because the intolerant type
moves away and thus “leads” the tolerant type, which ends up “following” (S3 Video). In con-
trast, leader-leader or follower-follower pairs (Fig. 3C and S4 Video), exhibit parallel move-
ment with frequent changes in direction (Fig. 3C and S4 Video), while larger groups of one
type form rigid immobile structures (S7 Video). This happens because foragers in leader-
leader, or follower-follower pairs, have the exact same repulsion and attraction tendencies:
foragers move to the position at which attraction and repulsion are balanced, causing rigid
Figure 3. Lineages and behavior in phase II and III. A: Lineages between year 40 (top left) and 600 (bottom right), with the transition from phase II to III
(crossing thick vertical line, year 320). At the origin of grouping (circle at a), there are two co-existing lineages (red and orange) which differ in their repulsion
zone (radius of orange circle F80 and L80, where the blue segment shows the repulsion turning angle aR, and the large arrow indicates the forager’s heading).
This difference in repulsion zone leads to the leader-follower movement shown in B, which is needed to overcome the lack of coordination when two leaders
(or followers) form groups (shown in C). Later, leaders and followers are differentiated in the repulsion turning angle (F180 and L180). Red lineages b, c, and d
are independently evolved leader lineages which co-exist with followers. During the transition from phase II to III, followers become independent from leaders
and bigger groups evolve (shown in D). From this point on, non-vigilant lineages (pV = 0, blue) repeatedly evolve and go extinct (small arrows e to i). B–D:
Visualization of movement of leader-follower (B) and two followers (C) at year 70, and movement of group foragers at year 400 in phase III (D).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117027.g003
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spacing. Such groups therefore remain longer in areas depleted of food. In contrast, the leader-
follower differentiation generates coordinated travel, and keeps groups small: the position of
the follower effectively represents a memory of where the pair just came from, enabling the
pair to move away from areas depleted of food. Thus they forage efficiently. Moreover,
larger groups with both leaders and followers tend to split up into a number of mixed pairs
(S6 Video).
Invasion simulations reveal that only in mixed pairs, leaders and followers can invade and
replace solitary foragers (results available on request): leaders and followers are therefore mu-
tually dependent via a “traveling mutualism”. This mutual dependency constrains the evolu-
tion of larger groups (see Supporting Information S5 Text), causing evolutionary stasis in
group size (Fig. 2B, phase II).
The constraints on group size are released when followers evolve independence. Indepen-
dence becomes possible after followers evolve very small, or no, repulsion turning angle (see
Supporting Information S6 Text), after which the repulsion zone can be thought of as a “toler-
ance zone”: foragers either are attracted to neighbors, or ignore them. This enables flexible
movement when neighbors are within the repulsion zone. In addition, over time (year 100–
320) the attraction turning angle aA declines for both followers and leaders (see Supporting In-
formation S6 Text). A smaller attraction turning angle limits the maximal turn of foragers, re-
ducing reactivity to neighbors. An overall group heading is therefore more easily maintained:
followers at year 140 and at year 250 split into sub-groups more readily, and move more effec-
tively, when initialized in large groups with their own kind (S8 Video), than leaders (S7 Video).
Since a large repulsion turning angle is a pre-requisite for being a leader, leaders cannot form
efficient groups of their own kind, and they go extinct when followers become independent.
Followers therefore inherit the world, generating the transition to phase III.
Phase III: Eco-evolutionary dynamics of group size and vigilance. In phase III larger
groups (S9 Video) and reduced vigilance evolve after the constraints on group size in phase II
have been released (Fig. 2B, from phase II to III). However, group sizes remain relatively small
compared to simulations with a greater risk of predation (Fig. 2A, compare dP = 5 to dP 5).
Thus, while there is a trend towards larger groups and less vigilance after phase II (Fig. 2B,
from phase II to III), at some point less vigilant foragers with stronger grouping tendencies can
no longer replace the existing population: there is a reversal of selection and new constraints
on group size arise, and relatively small groups with vigilance are maintained.
Lineage analysis reveals that non-vigilant foragers repeatedly evolve and go extinct (Fig. 3A,
blue lineages indicated by short arrows e to i). In simulations where we stop mutations, we find
that vigilant and non-vigilant foragers can co-exist, but only when non-vigilant foragers can
use the information about predators provided by vigilant foragers (Fig. 4A). The non-vigilant
foragers are therefore dependent on the vigilance of others: non-vigilant foragers are too un-
productive to compete with vigilant foragers when information transmission is prevented. Rel-
ative to the mutualistic leader-follower societies of phase II, the population has therefore
evolved to a socio-ecological setting characterized by a population of vigilant foragers in rela-
tively large groups, which (at least periodically) hosts non-vigilant information-parasites.
Non-vigilant foragers have a foraging advantage within groups, since the time they do not
use for vigilance is used for foraging. However, non-vigilant foragers can only invade vigilant
populations when large enough groups have evolved (see Supporting Information S7 Text),
and even then, non-vigilant foragers require stronger than average grouping tendencies to spe-
cialize on the largest groups in the population. This is because the parasitization by non-vigi-
lant foragers is not perfect: Vigilant foragers always have a survival advantage [18], because
they always benefit from their own vigilance (see Supporting Information S7 Text). The surviv-
al advantage is greatest in small groups and is negatively frequency-dependent: The survival
Evolution of Different Forms of Sociality
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advantage increases when the proportion of vigilant foragers declines (see Supporting Informa-
tion S9 Text). As a result, the invasion of non-vigilant foragers has several ecological repercus-
sions: (i) overall vigilance is reduced and death rates increase, which (ii) reduce both the
population size (see Supporting Information S7 Text) and global competition for resources;
and as a result (iii) group sizes decline, because grouping depends on population density
(Fig. 4B). All these factors cause the survival advantage of vigilant foragers to increase, so that
eventually non-vigilant foragers lose their fitness advantage (see Supporting Information
S7 Text). In this way, non-vigilant and vigilant genotypes with fixed grouping tendencies can
(in principle) co-exist. This negative frequency-dependence and the dependency of group size
on population density define the ecological context in which natural selection operates in
phase III.
We used controlled evolutionary simulations to study the effect of evolving grouping ten-
dencies (see Supporting Information S8 Text). These simulations start with vigilance fixed at
pV = 0.15 (first 50 years), allowing only grouping parameters to evolve, to establish the evolu-
tionary attractor for group size for this vigilance level (optimized group size). After year 50, we
allow vigilance to mutate between vigilance (pV = 0.15) and non-vigilance (pV = 0.0), and non-
vigilant foragers readily invade the population (see Supporting Information S8 Text). Initially
larger groups evolve, probably to compensate for increasing death rates. As a result, a within-
group selection feedback is generated, where less vigilance leads to larger groups and increased
within-group competition, which in turn leads to less vigilance (Fig. 5, solid lines).
The within-group selection mainly affects large groups, because small groups are less, or
not, affected by non-vigilant parasites. Therefore, although ‘small group’ vigilant foragers with
weak grouping tendencies were outcompeted by ‘optimized group’ vigilant foragers in the
Figure 4. Co-existence of vigilant and non-vigilant foragers. A: Invasion simulation showing a selected non-vigilant genotype (orange) invading a
population of a selected vigilant genotype (blue), after which both types co-exist. The non-vigilant genotype has a stronger grouping tendency and this
enables it to coexist with the vigilant genotype. Co-existence ends when non-vigilant foragers are prevented from fleeing when vigilant foragers flee (after
dashed line). Parameters for vigilant and non-vigilant foragers were taken from year 330 in the simulation of Fig. 2B. B: Average group size in vigilant (blue)
and non-vigilant foragers (orange), using the same genotypes as in A, decline as population size declines. We used simulations in which population size and
the ratio of vigilant and non-vigilant foragers was fixed. A greater proportion of non-vigilant foragers (dashed lines) leads to larger groups sizes since non-
vigilant foragers have stronger grouping tendencies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117027.g004
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absence of parasites, the invasion of non-vigilant parasites causes ‘optimized group’ vigilant
foragers to lose their competitive edge. This means that a niche for ‘smaller than optimized’
group sizes emerges again (Fig. 5, dashed lines), and new ‘small group’ vigilant lineages can
evolve (see Supporting Information S8 Text).
Such group size evolution can only occur if different grouping tendencies indeed result in
different lifetime group sizes, which is evident from the difference in group size between vigi-
lant and non-vigilant genotypes, where the latter has stronger grouping tendencies (Fig. 4B,
compare blue to orange). This group-size differentiation is the aggregate outcome of an assort-
ment process in groups that emerges without explicit grouping preferences (see Supporting
Figure 5. Eco-evolutionary interactions of vigilance and group size in phase III. Relatively small groups with high vigilance evolve after phase II, but this
generates a niche for less vigilant foragers. Reduced vigilance and larger groups therefore evolve, which reinforces the social niche of less vigilant foragers.
This can generate a within-group selection cycle (solid arrows). However, non-vigilant foragers in large groups forage inefficiently, leading to a reduced
global competition for resources. As a result the group-level selection of ‘small group’ foragers with high vigilance becomes possible, and these can
outcompete large groups with less vigilance. The population can therefore return to the situation with small groups and high vigilance (dashed arrows), where
the niche for less vigilant foragers will re-emerge. Evolutionary changes are in blue and there ecological consequences are in orange.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117027.g005
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Information S9 Text): Foragers with weak grouping tendencies end up on the periphery of
groups, and are more likely to split off together into small sub-groups (S10 Video). As a result,
group size can be selected for on a group-level, and small groups can take over the population.
However, even if non-vigilant foragers go extinct, they eventually return because the vigilant
population evolves to optimized group sizes again (see Supporting Information S8 Text),
where the niche of non-vigilant parasites re-emerges (Fig. 5, going from dashed lines back to
solid lines). The direction of selection for group size and vigilance is therefore determined by
group sizes in the population, and how the productivity of different group sizes is affected by
parasitization. This pattern of co-evolving group size and vigilance (Fig. 2B) offers an explana-
tion for the repeated emergence and extinction of non-vigilant lineages (Fig. 3A).
We therefore ran evolutionary simulations where we doubled the population (i.e. double the
area and carrying capacity of the environment), and reduced the mutation rate (from 0.05 to
0.0125). We find that group size fluctuations are dampened when both the population size is
doubled and the mutation rate is dropped (see Supporting Information S11 Text). The possibil-
ity of reduced amplitude of fluctuations indicates that stochasticity and evolutionary drift
could amplify the dynamics, or that the dynamics depend on the relative rates of evolutionary
and ecological processes. To distinguish between these and other alternatives deserves further
study, but is beyond the scope of this study. Important for the present study is that for the pop-
ulation sizes and mutation rates we studied, we observe relatively small groups with vigilance
being maintained. This maintenance can only occur if the invasion of less vigilant foragers with
stronger grouping tendencies is halted, due to the fact that groups with vigilance are more pro-
ductive than non-vigilant ones, and the small groups that limit parasitism can indeed be
selected for.
Thus, when predation risk is greater (dP 7) the maintenance of vigilance does not occur,
because the size of optimized groups shifts to larger values (see Supporting Information S10
Text). In this case, vigilant foragers can no longer compete with non-vigilant foragers, because
the small group sizes that the vigilant foragers need for escaping parasitism, are now too small
for appropriate survival and foraging. The result is large groups with no vigilance (Fig. 2A,
dP 7 and S11 Video).
Discussion
To determine how social evolution is affected by the specifics of individuals and eco-evolution-
ary feedback, we examined a simplistic evolutionary case-study, focusing on the co-evolution
between grouping, vigilance and foraging. Our results reveal an evolutionary trajectory with
multiple evolutionary phases with different forms of sociality, namely (i) societies with leader-
follower pairs, and (ii) small-group societies with fission-fusion dynamics. There are three
main implications of our results that are relevant for understanding the evolution of sociality.
First, the kinds of society that evolve in our model depends on the way that individual-level
details affect social patterns and their inter-relation: i.e. particular details of individuals can de-
termine evolutionary outcomes and dynamics. Thus, the leader-follower societies (Fig. 2B,
phase II) evolve because of constraints on individual cognition with respect to coordinated
movement in groups. This happens because the foragers in the model cannot remember a gen-
eral travel direction, and are either attracted to and aligning with, or repulsed from neighbors.
As a result, coordinated travel is difficult, even though it is essential for foraging efficiently.
Evolution therefore “comes up with” an ingenious solution: a leader-follower mutualism that
generates coordinated travel despite the cognitive constraints of the foragers. Leader-follower
travel enables directed travel away from areas depleted of food (S3 Video), and affects evolu-
tionary dynamics by generating evolutionary constraints on group size. More trivially, the
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evolution of fission-fusion societies in phase III (Fig. 2B, phase III) depends on constraints on
social structure: there is no direct way for foragers to form relationships and group preferential-
ly with particular foragers. Permanent bonded groups therefore cannot evolve, although such
social structure could affect how multi-level selection operates.
Second, our results support theory demonstrating that the co-evolution of grouping with co-
operative social traits enables the evolutionary maintenance of small groups where cooperation
can thrive [36]. In our model, cooperation is not predefined, but emerges from synergy gener-
ated by grouping. This cooperation is maintained via the co-evolution of social traits in two
qualitatively distinct ways. On the one hand, a seemingly unrelated social trait, namely coordi-
nated travel, indirectly helps maintain cooperative vigilance in leader-follower societies: For
long periods of time, the necessity for coordinated travel prevents the evolution of group sizes
where a cooperative dilemma arises. On the other hand, in phase III, like in the model of [36],
there is a cooperative dilemma. In phase III, non-vigilant foragers evolve, and these are analo-
gous to freeloaders: Within groups, non-vigilant foragers benefit from, but do not contribute
to, a public good provided by vigilant foragers. Like [36], we find that freeloaders reduce group
productivity and have stronger grouping tendencies than cooperative individuals. As a result,
cooperation is maintained directly via group-level selection for relatively small groups with
greater levels of cooperation.
Important in our model, is that the relative fitness of foragers with different vigilance levels
depends on group size. Thus, non-vigilant foragers can no longer benefit from freeloading
when groups are too small. As group sizes decrease, the socio-ecological context therefore
changes from a cooperative dilemma with freeloaders, to a mutualistic one where freeloading is
not advantageous. Small groups therefore provide a ‘refuge from freeloading’. Thus there is
group-level selection for group sizes where freeloading is reduced, made possible by assortment
into different sized groups via differences in grouping tendencies.
However, in Avilés’ case, the social context is by definition one where freeloading is possible,
unless individuals are solitary. Thus, Avilés’ model concerns an idealized hard-case scenario,
and she provides a proof of principle that the co-evolution of group size and cooperation can
maintain cooperation without a ‘refuge from freeloading’. It is possible that this result depends
on individuals spending their lives in a single group, as is assumed in her model. Thus, it re-
mains to be seen whether for fission-fusion societies, as in our model, a ‘refuge from freeload-
ing’ is a prerequisite for the maintenance of small groups with vigilance. The loss of vigilance
when predation risk increases (Fig. 2A, dP> 5), suggests that such a ‘refuge’ is important in
our model. Our results therefore highlight that emergent social processes may not exactly fit
idealized hard-case scenarios, and that group-level selection can operate in fission-fusion socie-
ties due to assortment via grouping tendencies.
The third implication is that by including specific individual details, and not predefining
costs and benefits, we can study how eco-evolutionary feedback generates evolutionary trajec-
tories that progress through several phases with different forms of sociality. In game-theoretic
terms this is equivalent to understanding how particular games originate and evolve into other
games. At present, evolutionary game theory generally does not address how games (strategies
and pay-off matrices) originate and evolve.
Our study shows that the specifics of individuals determine which ‘games’ arise, as well as
how they evolve into different ‘games’: Cognitive constraints lead to leader-follower travel as a
means to achieve coordinated travel, which in turn generates constraints on group size evolu-
tion, and hence a distinct socio-ecological attractor, namely mutualistic leader-follower socie-
ties. This is analogous to a type of coordination game, or rowing game [50], where group-level
selection dominates. The same mechanistic details determine that constraints on coordinated
travel are overcome, and a new socio-ecological attractor evolves, namely fission-fusion
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societies with a cooperative dilemma. This could be represented as a complex public goods
game [51], with a prominent role for within-group selection. In this way, we show how it is
possible to generate theory about how particular socio-ecological situations (‘games’) evolve
and change via eco-evolutionary feedback, and how such evolutionary changes relate to mecha-
nistic details and multi-level selection.
Relating our results to the evolution of sociality in real animals, such as primates and ante-
lope, requires taking simplifying assumptions into account. For instance, many animals are
phenotypically flexible and behaviorally sophisticated, and do not have grouping and vigilance
levels that are fixed over their lifetime, unlike the foragers in our model. Thus the time-scale on
which group size and vigilance vary, is expected to be shorter in real animals.
More specifically, we expect two ways in which changes in behavioral sophistication could
affect the evolution of leader-follower societies: (i) Greater behavioral flexibility would allow
leader and follower types to be generated phenotypically, rather than genetically: In non-evolu-
tionary models it has been shown that leader-follower movement can self-organize from differ-
ences in dominance [52] or differences in energy reserves [53]; (ii) Greater cognitive
sophistication, such as memory of a general travel direction, may cause the difficulties of coor-
dinated travel to disappear completely, in which case leader-follower societies would not
evolve. Our results therefore suggest that leader-follower travel may be a pre-requisite for coor-
dinated travel if there are cognitive constraints, and that leader-follower patterns can emerge
easily from an asymmetry in motivation to move. For instance, in various bird (e.g. ducks) and
mammal (e.g. antelope) species, offspring follow their mothers. Such patterns may simply be
the result of offspring having a greater motivation to follow their mother, than vice versa.
In our model we also assume a strong trade-off between vigilance and foraging, and find
that vigilance can only be maintained in relatively small groups. However, vigilance is present
in various animal species in much larger groups, and in primates, vigilance does not clearly de-
cline with increasing group size [54]. This implies that the trade-off is less strong in various
natural settings, for instance because individuals are also vigilant for other reasons, such as
keeping track of group members. Our results therefore provide a baseline for studying how
phenotypic flexibility affects the evolutionary dynamics of group size and vigilance, and for
studying how additional social complexity can affect the vigilance-foraging trade-off.
Given these simplifications, directly comparing the specific evolutionary trajectory that
arises in our model to that of particular animal species would be misplaced. Instead, our results
emphasize how evolutionary case-studies can be used to study the intermediate stages that are
involved during the evolution of particular forms of sociality. Intermediary stages reveal how
selection pressures change as societies evolve. As a result, the distinction between ‘how societies
evolve’ and the ‘present day function of sociality’ comes into focus. This distinction is necessary
for understanding shifts in functionality of traits, for example the shift in function of grooming
from primarily hygienic purposes to playing a major role in social bonding in primates. In fact,
this shift may be part of an evolutionary feedback between cognitive abilities and social bond-
ing, which has been proposed to have driven the evolution of large brains and complex societies
in the primate lineage [4, 9]. If true, it remains to be seen how such evolution depends on inter-
mediate stages and the particular details of primates, as opposed to those of antelope, where
such an evolutionary feedback apparently did not arise. Studying such issues requires elaborate
evolutionary case-studies, and a start can be made by extending our model with other kinds of
social interactions, such as grooming, and more sophisticated cognitive processing. In this way,
we envisage that the dynamics of the co-evolution of grouping with a multitude of individual
characteristics can be unraveled, so that we can better understand how different forms of soci-
ality may have evolved.
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S1 Video. Predation on solitary forager. Solitary individual foraging on food items. Large
white square: predator; Small black square: forager; Around forager: dark green flashing area il-
lustrates how it scans for the predator. Green: background; Lighter green circles: food items in
patches; This represents about 250 minutes of foraging viewed on a 400 by 400 meter area. On
the first approach the predator is detected and the forager flees (turns white). It then resumes
foraging, and is caught by the predator on the second approach.
(MP4)
S2 Video. Predation and grouping. A group of foragers (black squares) scanning for food. A
predator (large white square) approaches, but the foragers flee (turn white) when the predator
is detected: the detecting forager flees and triggers all its group mates to flee. Scanning for food
stops and all foragers wait “up a tree” until the predator has departed. Once all the foragers are
safe, the predator ignores them and looks for new targets. In this case none are in view and it
continues to move forward. Dark green is empty space, lighter green circles are food items.
(MP4)
S3 Video. Leader-follower pair from year 70. A leader-follower pair foraging from year 70 in
Fig. 2A. White with light green trail: FOLLOWER; Black with dark green trail: LEADER;
Green: background; Lighter green spots: food items; This represents 200 minutes of foraging
on a 400 by 400 meter area.
(MP4)
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S4 Video. 2 followers from year 70. A pair of two followers from year 70 in Fig. 2A, both
white with light green trail. Green: background; Lighter green spots: food items; This represents
200 minutes of foraging on a 400 by 400 meter area. Similar results are obtained with 2 leaders.
(MP4)
S5 Video. 10 leaders from year 70. 10 leaders foraging from year 70 in Fig. 2A: black with
dark green trails. Green: background; Lighter green spots: food items; This represents 200 min-
utes of foraging on a 400 by 400 meter area. Similar results are obtained with 10 followers.
(MP4)
S6 Video. 7 leaders and 3 followers from year 70. 7 leaders (black with dark green trails) and
3 followers (white with light green trails) from year 70 in Fig. 2A. Green: background; Lighter
green spots: food items; This represents 400 minutes of foraging on a 400 by 400 meter area.
(MP4)
S7 Video. 10 leaders from year 140. 10 leaders from year 140 in Fig. 2A: white with light
green trails. Green: background; Lighter green spots: food items; This represents 300 minutes
of foraging on a 400 by 400 meter area.
(MP4)
S8 Video. 10 followers from year 140. 10 followers from year 140 Fig. 2A: black with dark
green trails. Green: background; Lighter green spots: food items; This represents 300 minutes
of foraging on a 400 by 400 meter area.
(MP4)
S9 Video. 10 group foragers from year 400. 10 foragers from year 400 in Fig. 2A: black with
dark green trails. Green: background; Lighter green spots: food items; This represents 300 min-
utes of foraging on a 400 by 400 meter area.
(MP4)
S10 Video. Assortment. 20 foragers from year 189 in Fig. 1 of S8 Text: black foragers are those
with vigilance (pV = 0.15) and weak grouping tendencies; white foragers are those with no vigi-
lance (pV = 0.0) and strong grouping tendencies. Green: background; Lighter green spots:
food items.
(MP4)
S11 Video. Large group. 50 foragers from a uniform environment with high predation pres-
sure (dP = 9): black with dark green trails; White: focal individual. Green: background; Lighter
green spots: food items; This represents 200 minutes of foraging on a 400 by 400 meter area.
(MP4)
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